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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT FELTON; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP., 
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE 
RANCHES, a Utah general 
partnership; WHITE PINE 
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general 
partnership; and KENNETH R. NORTON, 
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation, 
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vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. 
SHARP, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Petition No. 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Court of Appeals held that wh^re an appellate court 
concludes facts have not been marshaled, thfe marshaling doctrine 
precludes any appellate review whatsoever of legal arguments. Was 
this holding in conflict with decisions of this Court? 
2. Was the Court of Appeals' refusal to address or rule on 
any of plaintiffs'/petitioners' (collectiveljy "White Pine") legal 
arguments — based upon that Court's misreading of the marshaling 
doctrine — such a departure from the usual course of judicial 
proceedings as to call for an exercise of t^ his Court's power of 
supervision? 
1 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals — in affirming the 
judgment of the District Court without any analysis or discussion 
of the legal issues presented — decided by default numerous 
heretofore unsettled and important questions 6f state law which 
have not been, and should be, settled by this Court. 
REPORT OF DECISION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is at 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
68 (June 5, 1990). 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
a. The Utah Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed 
was entered on May 25, 1990. 
b. An order of the Utah Court of Appeals denying rehearing 
was entered on June 26, 1990. 
c. The statutory authority for exercise of jurisdiction is 
78-2-2(5), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
CONTROLLING LAWS 
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, or regulations involved in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
White Pine sued Respondents (the "Sharps") for specific 
performance of a contract involving both platted and unplatted 
property in Summit County, Utah, and for damages arising from the 
Sharps' refusal to do so. 
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Statement of Facts 
A. The Parties' Contract, 
In 1980, certain petitioners, together with other persons not 
parties to this action, agreed to purchase jfrom the Sharps 60.078 
acres of unimproved real property near park City, Utah (the 
"Property"), for the purpose of developing four- or five-acre 
residential lots. (F. para. 1, Ex. D-14, TR. 27,81, 341; F. 
para. 2, TR. 341). 
At the closing of the sale (the "Closing"), the parties 
executed a Memorandum of Closing Terms ("Closing Memorandum"), a 
Trust Deed Note, a Trust Deed, and a Warranty Deed, collectively 
the "Contract", prepared by the Sharps' counsel, Jon C. Heaton. 
(Ex. D-15, D-3, D-2 and D-17; TR. 30-31, 88, 358; TR. 30-31). 
White Pine agreed to pay the Sharps £l,583,055.30 for the 
Property, $620,000 of which was paid as a down payment at Closing. 
(Ex. D-14). Pursuant to the Trust Deed Note> White Pine agreed to 
pay the Sharps the remaining $963,055,30 in five annual 
$192,611.06 installments. (Ex. D-3, TR. 33, 88-89). At Closing, 
the Sharps conveyed fee title to the Property to White Pine 
subject to the Trust Deed securing payment of the Trust Deed Note. 
(F. para. 10, Ex. D-2, Ex. D-3, Ex. D-15 and Ex. D-17; TR. 32-33, 
37, 90, 94-95). The Sharps agreed in the Closing Memorandum 
that 
after recordation of the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt 
of each $140,000.00 in principal (but nd>t including the 
earnest money and down payment money), [the Sharps] shall 
execute and deliver to rWhite Pinel a Partial Deed of 
Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot. 
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(F. para. 15, Ex. D-15 para. 1) (emphasis added). 
The Sharps also agreed that 
Upon the payment of the release price, [White Pine] shall 
be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of [White 
Pine's] choice upon receipt of the payment or at any time 
thereafter. 
(F. para. 16,, Ex. D-15 para. 2) (emphasis added). 
The Closing Memorandum also provided that 
at the time of execution of this Memorandum, [White Pine] 
have paid to [the Sharps] the sum of $620,000.00 which 
will release from the Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. 
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit 
County Recorder, fWhite Pine] shall be entitled to the 
release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of 
[White Pine's] choice together with the said roadway. 
(F. para. 17, Ex. D-15 para. 3, TR. 46, 89-90, 352-53) (emphasis 
added). 
It is undisputed White Pine paid the Sharps a total of 
$1,546,400.00, consisting of the down payment, the 1982 through 
1984 installments and part of the 1985 installment. (Ex. D-15, P-
44, TR. 36-39, 53-55, 94-96, 353-358). 
On December 23, 1983, the plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
(the "Plat") and the Declaration of Protective Covenants for White 
Pine Ranches, a Planned Residential Development (the "CCRs"), were 
recorded in the Office of the Summit County Recorder. (F. para. 
40, Ex. D-l, Ex. P-51, TR. 90-91). Six (6) lots and the private, 
internal roadway ("White Pine Lane" or "Roadway") were described 
on the Plat and dedicated as Phase I of the project. (Ex. D-l). 
The remaining Property (approximately one-half), abutting the 
Roadway to the south, was not platted. (F. para. 33). The Plat 
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delineated the existence and location of certain utility easements, 
including those for water linesf a water tank and water system, 
including substantial portions of which werje to be constructed on 
the unplatted property. (F. para 34, Ex. D-l). White Pine was 
prepared to plat the balance of the Property (the "unplatted 
property") at a later time and so advised the Sharps. (Ex. D-37, 
TR. 138, 202). 
On December 23, 1983, White Pine had satisfied all conditions 
in the Closing Memorandum and paid sufficient principal to entitle 
them to the release of five (5) lots and the Roadway. (Ex. D-7, 
Ex. P-51, Ex. P-53, TR. 90-91, 96, 322-23). By June 30, 1984, they 
paid additional principal entitling them to the release of a sixth 
lot. (Ex. P-53, TR. 49-50, 95-96). As of June 30, 1985, White 
Pine had paid sufficient principal to Entitle them to the 
reconveyance of 7.35 acres of the unplatted property. Id. The 
Sharps approved the recordation of the Plat and CCRs by executing 
a Consent to Record. (F. para. 39; EX. D-7; TR. 39-40). 
After recording the Plat and CCRs^ White Pine began 
construction of improvements benefiting all of the Property at a 
total cost of $1,063,348.10. (Ex. P-60; TR. 102-103). The 
improvements included construction of the Roadway, on-site 
improvements (underground electrical, gas, w^ter, fire hydrant and 
sewer systems) and off-site improvements, including lengthy sewer 
and utility systems. (TR. 138-39, 141-42, 2491-50,330). White Pine 
drilled on Lot 6 a culinary well to servte the Propertv, and 
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constructed on the unplatted property a large water storage tank 
for culinary purposes and fire protection. 
Although the Contract entitled White Pine to the reconveyance 
of Lots 1 through 5 no later than January 20, 1984, a Partial 
Reconveyance, reconveying Lots 1 through 5, was not recorded until 
March 28, 1986, more than two years later. (P-45; TR. 68-70). The 
Sharps, however, never released or reconveyed the Roadway. (TR. 
46, 457-59). Likewise, the Sharps never released Lot 6. 
On November 30, 1984, property taxes for Lot 6 and the 
unplatted property of approximately $4,725.00 became due and 
payable, of which White Pine paid $1,515.24. (F. paras. 48 and 49, 
TR. 707-708). The Sharps never asserted White Pine was in default 
due to the non-payment of property taxes until the Sharps filed 
their Answer and Counterclaim; they never claimed prior to June 30, 
1985 that White Pine defaulted. (TR. 50). 
B. Respondents' Foreclosure Of The Unreleased Property. 
The Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 
and thereafter published numerous Notices of Trustee's Sale. 
Before the sale took place, White Pine filed suit and obtained a 
temporary restraining order enjoining the trustee's sale. (R. 50-
51, 61). The parties subsequently stipulated to an injunction. 
(R. 96-97). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. The District Court Proceedings. 
White Pine claimed the Sharps materially breached the Contract 
because the Sharps had never reconveyed the Roadway, Lot 6 or the 
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7.35 acres. White Pine contended the Sharps were required to 
release the Roadway on December 23, 1983 (ot no later than January 
20, 1984), Lot 6 on June 30, 1984 and the 7.35 acres on June 30, 
1985. (Ex. D-53, TR. 96). The Sharps asserted, however, they were 
excused from reconveying this property because White Pine failed 
to request releases, or alternatively because the Consent to Record 
in effect released the Roadway. (R. 1650, |p. 45-47). White Pine 
sought specific performance of the Contract (i.e., release of Lot 
6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres) as well ^s damages arising from 
the Sharps' breach of the Contract. 
As a specific performance remedy, White Pine claimed the 
Sharps' failure to release and reconvey portions of the Property 
on or about January 20, 1984, excused White Pine's obligation to 
make further installment payments, and tolled the accrual of 
interest on the unpaid principal balance. White Pine further 
asserted the Sharps wrongfully refused to release and reconvey the 
Property, and White Pine accordingly was entitled to recover 
statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 57-^ 1-33. 
By counterclaim, the Sharps alleged ^hite Pine materially 
breached the Contract, sought a dissolution of the injunction to 
permit the Sharps' non-judicial sale of the property, and claimed 
damages for the wrongful issuance of the in|unction. Before and 
throughout trial, the Sharps sought to foreclose Lot 6, all of the 
unplatted acreage and the Roadway. Although the Sharps offered a 
stipulation during closing argument that their non-judicial or 
judicial foreclosure of the Roadway would not Extinguish the rights 
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of access of Lots 1 through 5 to the Roadway, the Sharps 
nonetheless sought the foreclosure of the Roadway. (R. 1641, p.27; 
R. 1650, p.43). 
The district court, rejecting every claim of White Pine, 
ruled inter alia, that: (1) White Pine materially breached the 
Contract by failing to pay property taxes for Lot 6 and the 
unplatted acreage on November 30, 1984, (approximately $3,200.00) 
(C. para. 2); (2) because this breach preceded any claimed breach 
of the Sharps, the Sharps were excused from releasing Lot 6, the 
Roadway and the 7.35 acres, notwithstanding White Pine's payment 
for the property; (3) White Pine was obligated to request and 
identify lots specifically for release (even though only one 
platted lot (Lot 6) remained to be released), but failed timely to 
do so prior to their breach on November 30, 1984, (C. paras. 8 and 
9); and (4) the Sharps were entitled to foreclose and sell Lot 6 
and all of the unplatted property. (C. paras 34-35). Judgment was 
entered against White Pine for $742,984.67, which sum included 
interest and attorneys' fees, and the property was ordered sold at 
Sheriff's Sale. (R. 1370, C paras 31-34). 
B. The Court Of Appeals Proceedings. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals totally ignored the extensive 
legal issues before it, and addressed White Pine's arguments as if 
they presented only issues of fact. Without addressing a single 
legal argument raised by the parties, the Court of Appeals, without 
any discussion or analysis, affirmed the following legal 
conclusions of the district court: 
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The Sharps did not breach the parties' contract by 
failing to reconvey property und^r the Trust deed, even 
though White Pine had paid foij it and the parties' 
Contract required the reconveyances as payments were 
made. 
The Sharps legally reconveyed t^ ie Property under the 
Trust Deed by signing a document merely consenting to the 
recording of a plat of the Property even though the 
document contains no conveyance, release, or granting 
language. 
The Sharps' breach of contract was legally excused by 
their reliance upon advice of counsel. 
The Sharps were excused from their contractual obligation 
to reconvey because White Pine, after paying for the 
property, failed to request the reconveyance of specific 
property prior to White Pine's default under the 
contract. 
White Pine was not entitled to the legal remedy of 
receiving specific reconveyances of property for which 
White Pine had expressly contracted with, and paid, the 
Sharps; instead, the Sharps were Entitled to retain the 
substantial sums paid for the reconveyances and to 
foreclose their lien on the property they were obligated 
to reconvey. 
White Pine first breached the contract by failing to pay 
approximately $3,200.00 in real estate taxes even though 
White Pine had paid more than $1,500,000.00 to the Sharps 
under the Contract. 
The Sharps — solely as trust deed beneficiaries, and not 
as fee owners — legally granted an easement to 
themselves over a roadway owned by White Pine. 
The district court made numerous, fundamental legal errors 
respecting the contract and real property issues presented by this 
case. However, despite the parties' extensive briefing of 
controlling legal authority of this Court — and relevant legal 
authority from other jurisdictions — the Co^ irt of Appeals failed 
to address any of the legal arguments because it concluded those 
issues 
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strike at the trial court's determination of whether 
there was a material breach of contract, and if so, when, 
and by whom. Such questions constitute issues of fact 
for the fact finder. 
Opinion, p. 5. These are not issues of fact. Rather, they are 
issues of law which the Court of Appeals was required to address 
and fundamentally erred in not doing so. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THIS CASE WITHOUT ADDRESSING 
ANY OF THE LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED; THIS COURT 
SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CORRECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY POWER 
In its May 25, 1990 Opinion, the Court of Appeals rendered a 
decision that erroneously departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings in its refusal even to consider or 
address any of the trial court's legal conclusions. It applied the 
marshaling doctrine in a way that is in direct conflict with 
numerous decisions of this Court. By doing so, the Court of 
Appeals tacitly affirmed, without any analysis whatsoever, the 
district court's determination of significant legal issues which 
have been heretofore undecided by any reported Utah appellate 
decision. In this extremely significant case, involving millions 
of dollars, the Court of Appeals reached a greatly inequitable 
result by failing to consider at all numerous legal authorities 
compelling a reversal of the trial court's judgment as a matter of 
law, irrespective of the correctness of the trial court's findings 
of fact. The Court of Appeals abdicated its duty — imposed by 
many decisions of this Court — to address the legal arguments 
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White Pine raised, and in so doing, announced a new and incorrect 
standard of appellate review• 
I. ISSUES OF BREACH AND PERFORMANCE ARE NOT. UNDER THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. QUESTIONS OF FACT, 
Its Opinion suggests the Court of Appe&ls affirmed the trial 
court because questions of breach "constitute issues of fact for 
the fact finder," This proposition, however is directly contrary 
to controlling Utah law. 
In Avoikos v. Lowry, 54 Utah 217, 179 P. 988 (1919), 
plaintiff/seller sued defendant/buyer for unpaid amounts allegedly 
owing under two contracts for the delivery of wool. Defendant 
admitted the contracts and that he had only p&id a specified amount 
thereunder, but asserted a counterclaim alleging the plaintiff 
failed to deliver the total amount specifiecU 
All claims went to trial before a jutry, which returned a 
verdict in plaintiff's favor for the full amount. Defendant 
appealed on three bases, including that: (1) the trial court erred 
in submitting to the jury the question of whether the amount of 
wool delivered substantially complied with the contract; and 
(2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that substantial 
compliance was a question of fact. Id. at 989-90. 
In reversing the jury award, this Court held that where, as 
here, the facts are undisputed, "the question of whether or not 
they constitute a performance or a breach ofj the contract is one 
of law for the Court." Id. at 90 (quoting 13 C.J. 790 para. 1011) 
(emphasis added). Since the sufficiency of the amount of wool 
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delivered presented a question of law, this Court concluded that 
it was error to submit that issue to the jury. Id. 
Avgikos, the only controlling Utah authority, is directly 
contrary to the Court of Appeal's statement that issues of breach 
and substantial performance are questions of fact. 
II. EVEN IF WHITE PINE DID CHALLENGE FINDINGS OF FACT ON APPEAL, 
THE COURT OF APPEALS STILL HAD A DUTY TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES' 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS. 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals overlooked, and failed 
to apply correctly, two separate lines of controlling Utah 
authority which conclusively establish either that (1) none of the 
issues raised by White Pine on appeal presents a question of fact; 
or (2) even if White Pine did fail to marshal evidence — a ruling 
White Pine respectfully submits is erroneous — the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless had a duty to determine if the trial court 
correctly applied the law. 
A. THE INTERPRETATION OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS DOCUMENT IS A QUESTION 
OF LAW; THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DOCUMENT IS ALWAYS A QUESTION 
OF LAW. 
The various breach issues on appeal involve unambiguous 
contractual language.1 The trial court's interpretation of such 
unambiguous language is to be accorded no deference on appeal, but 
reviewed de novo.2 
1
 Of all the Contract documents, the district court found only 
the phrase "pro rata cost to the purchaser", contained in paragraph 
7 of the Closing Memorandum, to be ambiguous. (C. 16). The 
district court accordingly permitted extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret that phrase, but made no finding that extrinsic evidence was 
necessary to interpret any other portion of the Contract. None of 
the trial court's legal conclusions, which the Court of Appeals 
affirmed without analysis in its Opinion, involved that phrase. 
2
 See, e.g. , Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 
1986); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Bradshaw 
v. Burninaham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 
P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 
(continued...) 
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Moreover, regardless of why a trial Court admits extrinsic 
evidence, such extrinsic evidence is admitted solely for the 
purpose of interpreting the terms of an ambiguous contract. Once 
a contract has been interpreted, however, tDie construction of that 
contract "is always reviewed as a law issu^." Fashion Fabrics of 
Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N,W.2d 22, 25 (la. 1978) 
(emphasis added). 
Consequently, to the extent Contract provisions were construed 
at all, questions involving (1) the Sharps' duty to reconvey; (2) 
the legal effectiveness of their purported Reconveyances; (3) the 
effect of White Pine's failure to make specific requests; (4) 
White Pine's entitlement to the legal remedy of receiving specific 
reconveyances for which White Pine had already paid the Sharps; and 
(5) whether the Sharps — who owned no fee interest — were able 
to grant an easement to themselves, were all Questions of law which 
should have been resolved de novo by the Court of Appeals. 
B. TO THE EXTENT WHITE PINE CHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT# THOSE 
FINDINGS WERE IRRELEVANT TO THE BREACH ISSUES CENTRAL TO THIS 
APPEAL; FAILURE TO MARSHAL DOES NOT kELIEVE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE (1) IF THE FINDINGS SUPPORT 
THE CONCLUSIONSf OR (2) WHETHER THOSE CONCLUSIONS CAN BE 
SUSTAINED UNDER ANY SET OF FACTS. 
1. White Pine Challenged Only Findings Unrelated to the 
Breach and Reconveyance Issues. 
White Pine did challenge some of the trial court's findings. 
None of these challenged findings, however, Wad any bearing on the 
2(...continued) 
(Utah App. 1989); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditjch Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1987)1 
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breach and reconveyance issues central to this appeal.3 No matter 
how much evidence may or may not support the trial court's 
findings, the Court of Appeals was nevertheless required to 
determine if the findings supported the legal conclusions 
challenged on appeal. 
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied the Marshaling Doctrine 
and Overlooked Its Duty to Determine Whether the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact Support Its Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, or If The Trial Court Applied Erroneous 
Principles of Law, 
The marshaling doctrine provides: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's find-
ings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and then demon-
strate that even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Unless the 
facts are marshaled, a trial court's findings of fact will not be 
disturbed. Id. Accordingly, in Scharf, where the appellant failed 
to marshal the evidence, this Court accepted the lower court's 
findings of fact. See, Id. 
3
 White Pine challenged (1) Finding No. 91 that the Sharps 
relied on the advice of counsel (Appellants' Brief ("AB") 22-24; 
Reply Brief ("RB") 23-24); (2) the findings pertaining to attor-
neys' fees (AB 47-48); and (3) the trial court's finding of market 
value (RB 12-13). Similarly, White Pine argues there is not 
evidence in the record to support certain legal conclusions made 
by the trial court (RB 20-21, 24). Obviously, it is impossible to 
marshal evidence when none exists. The only possible marshaling 
would be a citation to the entire trial transcript. An appellant 
simply cannot marshal the negative. 
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Of critical importance, however, the Scharf court did not 
merely affirm the judgment at that point; instead, it proceeded to 
consider and address appellant's specific dhallenges to the trial 
court's conclusions of law. Id. Thus, eyen where an appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence below, an appellate court still has 
a duty to examine "whether the trial count's findings of fact 
support its conclusions of law and judgment." Sampson v. Richins, 
770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added). In its 
Opinion, the Court of Appeals announced a tule of law in direct 
conflict with the controlling decisions of this Court. 
This Court has explicitly recognized this duty, implicit in 
all the marshaling cases, to examine legal argument irrespective 
of the failure to marshal. For example, in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the appellant failed t^ marshal all evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of f&ct and thus accepted 
those findings. Id. at 150. This Court, however, immediately 
thereafter made explicit reference to an appellate court's "duty 
. . . to determine whether those findings [justified] the trial 
court's conclusion of law," and it then proceeded independently to 
review that conclusion for correctness. Id. 
4
 This Court has applied this principle even where an 
appellant failed to provide the Supreme Court with any trial 
transcript at all. See, e.g., Powell v. Baatian, 541 P.2d 1127, 
1128 (Utah 1975); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 
383, 490 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1971). In both of those cases, this 
Court presumed that the trial court's findings were based upon 
competent and substantial evidence, and then automatically 
proceeded to determine whether those findings supported the trial 
court's conclusions of law. Id. 
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The following cases demonstrate the two-step nature of the 
required analysis: When an appellant fails to marshal evidence, 
the trial court's findings are presumed correct. See, State of 
Utah in Interest of P.H. v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565, 570 (Utah App. 
1989). The presumption is that the findings are supported by 
competent and sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1085, n. 2 (Utah 1985). When 
"findings are supported by competent evidence, they will not be 
disturbed by the reviewing court, but if erroneous principles of 
law are applied to the facts, as they were in this case, judgment 
on such facts will not be upheld on review." Survey Eng'rs Inc. 
v. Zoline Foundation, 532 P.2d 748, 751 (Colo. App. 1975) (emphasis 
added), rev'd on other grounds, 546 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1976). 
The Indiana Court of Appeals succinctly described the 
appropriate two-step analytical process on appeal: 
[T]his Court will employ a two-tier standard of review. 
First, it must be determined the evidence supports the 
findings. Then the Court must conclude the findings 
support the judgment. 
Keystone Square Shopping Center Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 
459 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
By failing to use this two-tiered analytical process, the 
Court of Appeals denied the parties their entitlement to appellate 
review of purely legal issues. For example, White Pine argued 
that, as a matter of law, White Pine is still entitled to a 
reconveyance of the property for which it paid. (Appellants' Brief 
(HABH) 14-19; Reply Brief ("RB") 8-14, citing e^., Columbia Dev. , 
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Inc. v, Watchie, 448 P.2d 360 (Ore. 1968); Burroughs v. Garner, 405 
A.2d 301 (Md. App. 1979); Eldridae v. Burnft, 76 Cal. App.3d 396, 
142 Cal Rptr. 845 (1978); Leisure Campgrouftd & Country Club Ltd. 
Pship. v. Leisure Estates, 372 A.2d 595 (M^. App. 1977)). White 
Pine argued that under these authorities it was entitled to this 
remedy notwithstanding any of the trial court's findings, including 
its finding that White Pine first breached (the parties' contract. 
The Court of Appeals, however, nevep even considered or 
addressed the issue of White Pine's legal entitlement to this 
remedy, a legal matter of first impression before the courts of 
this state. Thus, in effect, the Opinion transformed the 
marshaling doctrine into a doctrine of waiter by its requirement 
that legal argument will not be addressed if the facts are not 
marshaled, even if those facts are fundamentally irrelevant to 
legal issues on appeal. White Pine respectfully submits this 
approach has no precedent or foundation in the jurisprudence of 
Utah, and represents a radical misreading of the marshaling 
doctrine in direct conflict with the marshaling doctrine developed 
by this Court, warranting review and correction by this Court.5 
5
 The "advice of counsel" issue raised foy White Pine illust-
rates this unjust and inappropriate foreclosure of legal argument. 
White Pine argued, as a matter of law, that reliance on a counsel's 
advice is no defense to a breach of contract action. (AB 22, 
citing, Mann v. Glens Falls Inc. Co., 418 F.Siipp. 237, 251 (D. Nev. 
1974)). White Pine argued that no matter what the facts are, 
advice of counsel provides no defense to a breach of contract 
action. Because of its incorrect one-step analysis, however, the 
Court of Appeals announced a rule holding that such purely legal 
issues will never be reviewed in the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is in direct conflict with the 
decisions of this Court in three respects: (1) questions of breach 
and substantial performance are questions of law for the court 
when, as here, the facts are undisputed or presumed correct; (2) 
the interpretation of an unambiguous document presents only-
questions of law, and the construction of a document is always a 
legal issue; and (3) the marshaling doctrine applies only when 
findings are challenged, and in any event does not eliminate an 
appellate court's duty to review for correctness the trial court's 
application of the law to the findings made. These conflicts with 
this Court's decisions provide grounds for grant of certiorari so 
this Court can exercise its corrective powers. 
The opinion departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings by refusing to analyze or consider any legal 
issues raised because White Pine purportedly failed to marshal 
evidence. Unless this Court reviews it, the Opinion of the Court 
of Appeals will establish a new and inappropriate condition for 
appellate review: all appellants will hereafter have to marshal 
all evidence to support all findings the appellants anticipate the 
appellate court may feel are disputed in order to avoid waiving 
their right to have their purely legal arguments considered. No 
reported Utah decision has ever so much as intimated that a failure 
to marshal evidence creates an absolute bar to appellate review of 
whether the facts found could support the resulting legal 
conclusions. 
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The refusal of the Court of Appeals to Consider or rule on any 
legal arguments is a miscarriage of appellate review so far beyond 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that this 
Court should grant certiorari so as to exercjise its inherent power 
of supervision. The scope of this Court's review of the Court of 
Appeals' action is very broad under a Wifit of Certiorari and 
encompasses a reivew of whether the " ^ proceedings were had in 
accordance with law and to correct errors in law affecting the 
substantial rights of parties'", Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 
42 (Utah 1981) (certiorari is available in aid of an appellate 
court's supervision of the actions of inferior courts, citing 
Gilbert v. Board of P. and F. Comm'rs, 11 Utah 378, 389, 396, 40 
P. 264 (1895); House v. Mavo, 324 U.S. 42, 44-45, 65 S. Ct. 517, 
519-520, 89 L.Ed. 739 (1945); Rex v. Northumberland Compensation 
Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 K.B. 338, 346, 3481. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals has refused to review the 
district court's decision of numerous unsettled areas of law. The 
determination of these numerous unsettled is$ues should not occur 
by default, as happened in this case. The statute permitting this 
Court to refer appeals to the Court of Appeals does not contemplate 
that the Court of Appeals decide such unsettled issues by refusing 
to address them at all. 
White Pine was entitled to an appeal of the district court's 
legal conclusions either to this Court or to the Court of Appeals. 
Long ago, Chief Justice John Marshall set ijorth the duties and 
obligations of an appellate court in reviewing appeals: 
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It is most true that this court will not take 
jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true 
that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The 
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure 
because it approaches the confines of the constitution. 
We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With 
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may 
be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before 
us. We have no more right to decide the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is 
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the 
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly 
avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do, is to 
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to 
perform our duty. 
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257, 291, (1821). 
The Court of Appeals failed to perform its appellate function 
in the foregoing three aspects. Accordingly, a Writ of Certiorari 
should be granted; the Opinion of the Court of Appeals should be 
reviewed and reversed; and either this Court or the Court of 
Appeals should address the numerous legal issues raised by the 
parties. 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants in 
an action for breach of contract and slander of title. 
Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's determination that a 
temporary restraining order was wrongfully issued, entitling 
defendants to damages from injunction bonds posted by, and on 
behalf of, plaintiffs. We affirm the judgment on the contract, 
but reverse the award of damages against the injunction bonds. 
This dispute arises from the sale of approximately 60 acres 
of land near Park City, Utah, owned by John C. and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp ("sellers"). Plaintiff White Pine Ranches, a general 
partnership consisting of Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, 
Kenneth R. Norton, and Paul H. Landes ("buyers"), purchased the 
property on July 16, 1981, for the purpose of constructing a 
"Planned Unit Development" (PUD)2 of four- or five-acre lots 
and an internal roadway. Buyers paid $620,000 down on a total 
purchase price of $1,583,055.30, and executed a trust deed and 
note providing for equal annual installment payments of 
$192,611.06 on the balance due. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
2. "Planned unit development" is generally defined as a private 
residential development on acreage of certain minimum size, 
usually large enough to constitute a new community. See Stevens 
v. Essex Junction Zoning Bd., 139 Vt. 297, 428 A.2d 1100, 1103 
(1981). 
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An "Offer to Purchase" and "Memoranduni of Closing Terms" were 
also executed (hereafter referred to as the "contract"), and 
included the following provisions: (1) upon receipt of the down 
payment and recordation of a "PUD Plat and Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions," tpree lots of buyers' 
choice together with the internal roadway bonnecting the lots to 
the county road would be released from the trust deed; (2) after 
recordation and upon receipt of each $140,000 in principal, one 
PUD lot of buyers' choice would be released from the trust deed; 
(3) sellers would grant Summit County a st 
the county road, or, if the road was shown 
platted, to grant to the county the road as it existed; (4) 
sellers would warrant marketable title subject only to easements 
and reservations of record; (5) buyers would provide sellers with 
a water and sewer connection at a pro rata cost, at such time as 
the connections became available; (6) buyers would sell 50 
acre-feet of irrigation water to sellers for the discounted cost 
of $100,000 cash; (7) buyers would be responsible for all taxes 
and assessments after assuming possession of the premises; (8) 
failure to make the annual installment payments within thirty 
days of the annual anniversary date would constitute a default; 
and (9) in the event of a breach or default, the defaulting party 
would pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, 
incurred in enforcing any obligation or right under the contract. 
Buyers made installment payments in 1982, 1983, 1984, and a 
partial payment in 1985. Buyers also made certain improvements 
to the property and the internal roadway at a cost of over a 
million dollars, funded in part by a construction loan from Tracy 
Collins Bank & Trust Company ("Tracy Collins"). On or about 
November 23, 1983, sellers executed a "Consent to Record" with 
respect to buyers' plat describing "Phase ir of the project, 
which involved six lots and the roadway. The plat and a 
"Declaration of Protective Covenants" were officially recorded on 
December 23, 1983. The plat indicated that the internal roadway 
was to be private, in contravention of sellers' intent to have 
the roadway dedicated to public use. 
Although sellers requested the trustee On January 18, 1984, 
to release and reconvey lots 1 through 5, no mention of the 
roadway was made, and no reconveyance was recorded until March 
28, 1986. Meanwhile, property taxes for lot 6 and the unplatted 
property became due on November 30, 1984. Of the $4,725 assessed 
for taxes, buyers paid only $1,515.24. Buyers also paid only a 
portion of the installment payment due in Jujne 1985. 
Sellers subsequently recorded a notice ol 
September 16, 1985, and gave notice of a tru| 
the internal roadway, and all the unplatted 
filed this action on September 4, 1986, the 
scheduled trustee's sale, and were granted 
f default on 
stee's sale of lot 6, 
property. Buyers 
|day before the 
order temporarily an 
880710-CA/880711-CA 3 
restraining the sale. The initial temporary restraining order 
required a cash bond in the amount of $2,400, which buyers 
posted. The parties thereafter stipulated to an injunction 
pending trial, and the district court imposed a $50,000 
injunction bond. The bond was posted by Tracy Collins acting as 
surety for buyers, in an attempt to protect its security interest 
on the construction loan issued to buyers. 
In their complaint, buyers sought specific performance of 
certain obligations under the contract, specifically, the release 
of lot 6, the internal roadway, and 7.35 acres of the unplatted 
property. Buyers also sought damages arising from sellers' 
alleged breach of contract. Sellers counterclaimed, asserting 
that buyers had breached the contract. They sought dissolution 
of the injunction, damages for its wrongful issuance, an order of 
judicial foreclosure on the property, and recovery on the trust 
deed note. 
A bench trial was held on January 28-29 and March 22-25, 
1988. The trial court held that buyers had materially breached 
the contract by failing to pay property taxes on lot 6 and the 
unplatted acreage, and by failing to satisfy their 1985 and 1986 
installment obligations. The court further held that the 
contractual breach occurred before any alleged breach by sellers, 
and that further performance by sellers was excused after buyers' 
breach. Buyers also failed to request release of lots until 
after their own breach had already occurred, facts which the 
court believed affected the credibility of buyers' claims. In 
contrast, sellers were found to have substantially complied with 
the terms of the contract, and that the recordation of the 
Declaration of Protective Covenants and the Consent to Record 
constituted a release of the roadway. Judgment was entered for 
sellers in the amount of $759,415.63. This amount included 
$144,088.75 in attorney fees, which were awarded under the terms 
of the trust deed and note and the contract. 
After finding that buyers had breached the contract, the 
trial court determined that the temporary restraining order 
against sellers had been wrongfully issued. The court then 
determined that the appraised fair market value of the property 
upon which sellers were entitled to foreclose was $728,445. That 
sum was deducted from the total judgment, leaving sellers 
undersecured in the amount of $30,970.63. The court awarded 
sellers that amount against the bonds by entering judgment on the 
$2,400 cash bond, in full, and $28,570.63 against the bond posted 
by Tracy Collins. The court also determined that four percent of 
the attorney fees incurred in defense of the lawsuit could be 
attributed to defending against the wrongfully issued injunction, 
and awarded attorney fees against the bonds in the amount of 
$5,763.55. Buyers and the surety have brought this consolidated 
appeal to challenge the respective judgments against them. 
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We first consider the appeal brought bV buyers, who argue 
that the trial court erred in concluding that they, not sellers, 
breached the contract. Buyers claim entitlement to specific 
performance and damages, and argue that sellers are precluded 
from recovering attorney fees. Buyers also claim that the trial 
court erred in concluding that they granted to sellers an 
easement over the roadway and that the temporary restraining 
order had been wrongfully issued. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
At the conclusion of trial, the court 
encompassing eight transcribed pages. Thei 
issued its judgment accompanied by 104 sepc 
fact. Buyers* brief lists over two pages 
subissues. Although buyers state that "th€ 
this appeal are questions of law reviewabl* 
for correctness," we conclude, after scruti 
that buyers are essentially challenging the 
findings of fact. 
tade oral findings 
eafter, the court 
rate findings of 
f issues and 
issues presented in 
by an appellate court 
nizing those issues, 
trial court's 
Buyers argue that sellers breached the contract by failing to 
make all the required reconveyances and thdt this breach was 
never excused by buyers' failure to make specific requests for 
those releases. Buyers also dispute the trli 
that the evidence "established that the pari 
ial court's finding 
ties by both mutual 
intent and agreement granted to the Defendants the use of the 
roadway." Buyers further contest the finding that sellers 
substantially performed their obligations under the contract. 
All of these "legal issues,H however, strike at the trial court's 
determination of whether there was a material breach of contract, 
and if so, when, and by whom. Such questions constitute issues 
of fact for the fact finder. See Siobera 
966, 969 (Mont. 1988); Wasserburaer v. Amer 
Kravik, 759 P.2d 
rCan Scientific Chem, 
Inc., 267 Or. 77, 514 P,2d 1097, 1099 (1973) (en banc); S££ also 
American Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil Supply, Inc., 283 Or. 183, 
583 P.2d 521, 528 (1978) (substantial performance under a 
contract is a question of fact). 
Our standard for overturning factual findings is a rigorous 
one—we may not set aside such findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball. 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 
1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To establish clear error, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' . . . ." In re Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987)). This burden "is a heavy one, (reflective of the 
fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed 
facts." Jjl. at 886. Accordingly, when an a|ppellant fails to 
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carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, "we refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the 
findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 
783 P-2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
We are thus obliged to consider the findings from the 
standpoint of the supporting evidence and not from "appellant's 
view of the way he or she believes the facts should have been 
found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). Since 
buyers have not marshaled the evidence in support of those 
findings, but merely argue that there is evidence contradicting 
them, they have failed to demonstrate that the findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. We must therefore 
accept the findings as valid and affirm the judgment. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
With respect to the award of attorney fees, "the court may 
award reasonable fees in accordance with the terms of the 
parties' agreement." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Travner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 858 
(Utah 1984) (per curiam)). Although the interpretation of 
unambiguous contractual terms is a question of law to which the 
trial court's ruling is afforded no particular deference on 
appeal, Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 584-85 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989), when 
those terms are determined to provide for an award of attorney 
fees, they are to be "awarded as a matter of legal right." 
Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 836 (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 
622, 625 (Utah 1985)). 
The contract provides that "the defaulting party shall pay 
all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out of 
breach or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, 
whether incurred with or without suit and both before and after 
judgment." We conclude, as the trial court implicitly did, that 
this provision is unambiguous. Based on the court's 
determination that buyers breached the trust deed, trust deed 
note, and the contract, the trial court properly ruled that 
sellers were entitled to their attorney fees reasonably 
incurred. £££, e_^ L. , Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 
1988) . 
The amount of such an award is within the trial court's 
discretion, Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 836, but must be reasonable, 
Canvon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989), 
and supported by adequate evidence. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). At the court's instruction, 
sellers' counsel submitted an affidavit and supporting documents 
as evidence of reasonableness. We perceive no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's determination that this 
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affidavit, never rebutted, was sufficient Ito support an award of 
fees. See ifl.; zse also Freed Fin. Co. v.I Stoker Motor Co., 537 
P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
THE INJUNCTION BOND$ 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions ("Commissioner"), 
as receiver for Tracy Collins, appeals the judgment against the 
injunction bonds. The Commissioner seeks to avoid liability by 
arguing for the first time on appeal that the posting of the 
surety bond was an ultra vires act by Tracy Collins. 
Although issues not raised below cannot generally be 
considered on appeal, see James v. Preston 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Commissioner urges us to create an 
exception to this rule under the theory of "adverse domination." 
This theory provides that as long as a corporation is controlled 
or "dominated" by wrongdoers against whom a cause of action 
exists, the statute of limitations is tolled because the 
wrongdoers cannot be expected to bring an ^ction against 
themselves. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. [Hudson. 673 F. Supp. 
1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987). 
Because Tracy Collins did not have the 
surety, the Commissioner alleges, the bank1 
been subjected to liability had they asserted the ultra vires 
claim at trial. Therefore, so the argument 
Commissioner, as receiver, should now be pe| 
theory of adverse domination to assert the 
on appeal. 
power to act as a 
s officers would have 
goes, the 
rraitted under the 
fclaim of ultra vires 
Although there are exceptions to the rule prohibiting 
consideration of issues for the first time on appeal, they are 
few in number. See State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 47-48 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (e.g., exceptional circumstances, plain 
error, liberty interests). It appears that such exceptions are 
to be applied only when gross injustice resulting from 
application of the rule overwhelms its purpose—that being to 
correct errors at trial, avoiding "a merry-go-round of 
litigation." gundy v- Century Equip, Co,, 692 P.2d 754, 758 
(Utah 1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 
301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970)). 
The Commissioner has brought to our attention no exceptional 
circumstance to support the carving out of yet another exception 
to the rules of appellate review. Although the Commissioner 
urges us to adopt its approach by noting that it was not a party 
below, buyers were likewise deprived of the lopportunity to submit 
the ultra vires issue to the trial court and have it resolved 
without the necessity of this appeal. Since the Commissioner 
offers no authority for extending the theory of adverse 
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domination beyond the limitation of actions against corporate 
wrongdoers, and we see no other reason to do so, we decline to 
consider its claim of ultra vires. Accord Wallace Bank & Trust 
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho 712, 237 P. 284, 287 (1925) 
(ultra vires may not be asserted for the first time on appeal). 
We next address the Commissioner's claim that the trial court 
improperly awarded attorney fees incurred in resisting the 
temporary restraining order. The trial ~~?urt accepted sellers' 
calculation that four percent of their t-:al attorney fees of 
$144,088.75 were spent defending against the "injunction."3 
The trial court then awarded $5,763.55 of those fees against the 
bonds. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, no 
restraining order or preliminary injunction 
shall issue except upon the giving of 
security by the applicant, in such sum as 
the court deems proper, for the payment of 
such costs and damages as may be incurred or 
suffered by any party who is found to have 
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
Our supreme court has determined that "damages" subject to 
recovery under this rule include the attorney fees of the party 
wrongfully enjoined. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. 
Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). We 
have since extended that recovery to attorney fees incurred as 
the result of a wrongfully issued temporary restraining order. 
See Beard v. Duadale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
When attorney fees are incurred in defending against wrongfully 
obtained injunctive relief and also against an underlying 
lawsuit, it is appropriate to determine how much of the total 
fees are attributable to resisting the injunction. See id.: see 
also Artistic Hairdressers, Inc, vt bevy, 87 Nev. 313, 486 p.2d 
482, 484 (1971) (only the attorney fees directly related to 
dissolution of the wrongful injunction are recoverable). We 
therefore affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees against 
the bonds. 
We last address the Commissioner's argument that the trial 
court used an incorrect measure in awarding damages under rule 
65A(c) against the injunction bonds. The trial court calculated 
damages by adding principal ($371,739.35), interest ($203,664.50), 
3. The reference to an "injunction" appears to refer to both 
the temporary restraining order and the stipulated preliminary 
injunction. 
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late fees ($14,869.57), taxes ($20,368.62), attorney fees 
($144,469.75), trustee's fees ($1,803.80), and costs ($2,881.04) 
for a total of $759,796.63. The court nex|: considered the 
testimony at trial of a real property appraiser who determined 
that the fair market value of the unconvey^d property was $17,500 
to $20,000 per acre at the time the temporary restraining order 
was imposed. The trial court then found that the value of the 
property on the date of judgment was $20,000 per acre, totalling 
$728,445.00. Since the value of the property as collateral was 
less than the total judgment, the trial court found that buyers 
were undersecured and awarded the difference ($30,970.63) as 
damages for the wrongfully issued injunction. 
The Commissioner claims that this calculation was erroneous, 
and asserts that the correct measure of damages is "the reduction 
or diminution in the value of the security during the period of 
restraint." Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Nat*1 Bank, 83 Nev. 
196, 427 P.2d 1, 4 (1967).See also Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. 
Kniaht, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. CtJ App. 1971). We 
agree. Although sellers were restrained fijom foreclosing the 
property for approximately two years, they (retained both the 
trust deed note and the unconveyed property during that time. 
The trial court found that the value of the property did not 
diminish in those two years. Any measure of damages other than a 
comparison of the fair market value of the (property before and 
after the injunction is thus incorrect. 
Sellers argue, however, that buyers' argument ignores the 
concept of "present value." They contend that the award of 
interest under the judgment is inadequate, under the assumption 
that they would have had available the interest earning capacity 
of the foreclosure sale proceeds had the sale been held as 
scheduled. Alternatively, they suggest that an appraisal showing 
the value of the property in 1988 to be the same as that in 1986 
actually represents a decrease in value whei 
inflation is taken into account. Aside froji 
nature of such claims, sellers' interest lojsses on the trust deed 
note were taken into consideration and awarded as part of the 
total judgment. Interest was awarded at the rate of twelve 
percent on the unpaid principal, eighteen percent on the payments 
in default, and also included a four percent: late payment 
charge. Surely those charges more than compensated sellers for 
the interest-bearing potential of money or the effects of 
inflation during the two-year period. 
the effect of 
the speculative 
In any event, the Commissioner is cor 
"recoverable damages under such a bond are 
the operation of the injunction itself and 
occasioned by the suit independently of the 
741 P.2d at 969 (quoting Lever Bros. Co. v. 
rectt in asserting that 
those that arise from 
i^ ot from damages 
injunction." Beard, 
International Chem. 
Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 976)). On that 
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basis, the interest accrued on the trust deed note during the 
delay in the sale of the property may be awarded in the judgment, 
as was done in this case, but cannot also be attributed as 
damages under the injunction bond. See Glens Falls, 427 P.2d at 
4. Since sellers did not demonstrate any damages attributable to 
the imposition of the injunction other than a portion of their 
attorney fees, the award of damages against the bonds must be 
reversed. 
In summary, we affirm the judgment on the contract. We 
reverse the award of damages against the injunction bonds, except 
for the attorney fees. Such fees are to be assessed against the 
bonds in a proportion to be determined by the trial court. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. No costs 
awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, Davidson, an$ Larson.1 
Upon consideration of Appellants' Petiti] 
Motion for Stay and to approve a supersedeas | 
for Expedited Hearing, it is hereby ORDERED a 
on for Rehearing, 
bond, and Motion 
s follows: 
1. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing is denied and this 
matter is immediately remitted to the distriqt court, pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), Utah R. App. P. 
2. Based upon appellants' representati 
harm and an agreement to provide a supersedeaj 
appellant is granted a temporary stay for thi 
further proceedings in the district court, i 
ons of irreparable 
s bond on appeal, 
rty days of all 
nlcluding any 
1. Judge John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, acting 
by special appointment on the Petition for Rehearing, along 
with Judges Bench and Greenwood. The remaining provisions of 
the order are decided by the Court's Law and Motion panel, 
Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Davidson. 
EXHIBIT B 
execution sale or further proceedings to enforce or satisfy the 
judgment. This stay shall expire on Thursday, July 26, 1990. 
3. Appellants' motions for approval of a supersedeas bond 
and for an expedited hearing are hereby rendered moot and, 
therefore, are denied. 
DATED this 7 / — day of June, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
2 
